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ABSTRACT
In many typical application scenarios, it is necessary to revoke
the incorrect account operations caused by user mis-operation, fi-
nancial fraud, illegal hacking, etc. Unfortunately, users often blur
the lines between the concept of "transaction state revocable" and
"business status revocable", which result in revocable transaction
not universally supported in blockchain systems at present.
In this work, we proposeGateChain, a blockchain that support
revocable transaction model (RTM) on distributed ledger. Specifi-
cally, based on the state-of-the-art block-chain technologies,Gate-
Chain can safely withdraw the account status change opera-tions
by leveraging an improved accountmodel and extra designed trans-
action types. On that basis, GateChain exploit the characteristics
of functional completeness, easy to deployment and lower com-
plexity.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology is innovative and continuously evolving. It
has gained unprecedented attention from both the research and in-
dustrial communities. As an important application of a blockchain,
a distributed ledger can effectively record the change in user ac-
counts. However, in many typical application scenarios, it is nec-
essary to revoke the incorrect account operations caused by user
mis-operation, financial fraud, hacking, etc. In particular:
• In a distributed ledger, the private key of a user’s account
is the unique identifier of the user’s identity. If the private
key is stolen due to hacking or misuse, the assets held in the
account cannot be recovered. A major event where this hap-
pened was on February 7, 2014, Mt.Gox, an exchange that
traded 70% of all Bitcoin at that time, lost 850, 000 bitcoins
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due to a hack. This event caused the exchange to go bank-
rupt, and to date, has not compensated the loss to its users.
• In both Bitcoin[9] and Ethereum[15] systems, if assets are
transferred to a wrong address due to any reason, techni-
cally the loss cannot be recovered. This can be caused by
user’s inappropriate operations, as well as malicious finan-
cial fraud.
To ensure the safety of standard user operations, a blockchain
that supports revocable operations has received widespread atten-
tion [3]. Noteworthy, currently in both research and industry com-
munities, some hold a traditional view believing that once trans-
action data is recorded on a blockchain system, it should remain
immutable in any case. The "classic" Ethereum project ETC [5] is
an outstanding example. Contrary to it, those holding a develop-
ment view typically argue that technology itself is continuously
evolving, and the future development of technology should not
be defined by the current characteristics of a blockchain [1, 7].
The root cause of this controversy lies in the confusion between
"transaction state revocable" and "business status revocable" on a
blockchain. To be specific, from a business perspective, the irre-
versible nature of a blockchain transaction safely prevents data on
chain from being tampered with in a decentralized manner.
This provides a low-cost mechanism for data safety, which is
considered to have broad application prospects [14].However, from
the end-user’s point of view, data modification and operations is
undoubtedly a necessary function for an effective business system.
Clearly, under strict regulatory conditions, a ledger system should
provide the functionality of modifying and withdrawing the oper-
ation performed on the account states.
Generally, the existing revocable technology on Bitcoin and Eth-
ereum systems can be divided into three categories. The first type
is represented by the EOS system [4] which approves the revoca-
tion of operations by majority voting in quorum. However, this
type of technology does not support the rollback of the transaction
itself. This means that the data recorded on the blockchain cannot
be changed. The second type is applying a "hard fork", which com-
pletely modifies the chain and account states. A "hard fork" can be
seen as controversial by the industry. An example of this happened
in June 2016, when a project named "The DAO" was hacked which
resulted in a large amount of Ethereum (ETH) being stolen. This
forced the Ethereum community to perform a hard fork to recover
the stolen ETH [8]. The third type uses advanced technology like
the Lightning Network [10]. The Lightning Network can cancel un-
confirmed transactions, but it is not suited for a transaction that is
already recorded on the blockchain. Similarly, revocable technolo-
gies on blockchains has also received widespread attention in the
academic field. Specifically, some research [2, 11] have proposed an
editable blockchain technique to modify the block by direct com-
pliance to achieve the purpose of the revised operations. However,
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these technologies are mostly implemented as prototype systems.
The safety and reliability of such academic systems have not yet
been verified.
To address this issue, in this paper we take the first step toward
realizing revocable operations on a blockchain. Targeting real-world
application requirements, such as the loss of a user’s key and trans-
fer operation errors, we propose GateChain, a blockchain system
that supports a revocable transactionmodel (RTM) on a distributed
ledger. Specifically, based on state-of-the-art blockchain technolo-
gies, GateChain can safely withdraw the account status change
operations by leveraging an improved account model and extra de-
signed transaction types. On that basis, GateChain exploits the
characteristics of functional completeness, is easy to deploy, and
lowers complexity.
To summarize, the contributions we made in this paper are as
follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, GateChain is the first work
on realizing revocable account operations by leveraging an
improved accountmodel and extra designed transaction types.
Considering that this blockchain provides support for trans-
action verification, the revocable operations proposed in this
paper adopted the transaction model of aUtxo-based block-
chain. In essence, the transaction method can make full use
of proven, mature blockchain technologies, and can be re-
garded as a "native" realization of the revocable operations.
• GateChain proposes a user-friendly account model. Com-
paredwith the traditional blockchain accountmodel adopted
by Bitcoin and Ethereum, the account model of GateChain
introduces a radical new vault account type, which is de-
signed to support the withdrawal of account status change.
The design of this vault account provides users with better
security.
• A real world application of GateChain is provided as a
verifiable implementation of revocable business logic, with
more comprehensive considerations on security, usage, as
well as performance issues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 introduces the design of RTM.
Section 3 explains the safety considerations of RTM
Section 4 presents the design of GateChain, a verifiable real-
ization of RTM.
Section 5 summarizes the paper and mentions the direction of
future work.
2 THE DESIGN OF RTM
Blockchain technology provides a decentralized distributed ledger
architecturewhich supports complete, sequential transaction chain
recording. In a typical distributed ledger application, the user’s as-
sets are represented as the states in the account, and the states can
only be changed by designated transactions, which are recorded
and managed by a blockchain system. In essence, from the applica-
tion level, revoking a transaction is not deleting the records of the
transaction from the blockchain, but to support the user to with-
draw the account status change caused by the transaction.
In this section, we propose a Revocable TransactionModel (RTM),
a blockchain-based transactionmodel that supports revocable logic,
for the sake of avoiding user account losses caused by misuse, fi-
nancial fraud, and illegal hacking. The key features of RTM can be
summarized as:
• The intrinsic value of RTM is based on state-of-the-art block-
chain technologies, which ensures that all transactions recorded
on the chain cannot be tampered with.
• To support the revocation of account status, we propose a
radical new transaction model called RTM. With addition-
ally designed transactions, RTM can support the revocation
of the account status change within a designated delay pe-
riodθ . The design of these transactions ensure the complete-
ness of the extended transaction state machine.
• To support revocable transactions, RTM includes the struc-
ture of a "Vault Account" which is especially created for the
revocation of account status. In real world applications, the
vault account mechanism can tackle the problem of user pri-
vate key loss, thus greatly enhance the security of the whole
ledger application.
2.1 Basic Concepts
Intrinsically, the basic idea of the RTM is to initiate a transaction
that support withdraw the change of given account status within
a certain period of time, i.e. the delay period θ . To be specific, the
account can be seen as the collection of business status of a given
user at a given time. Consider the reliability guarantee provided by
the blockchain, the transactions between accounts can be assumed
as safe and reliable, with no additional design required. Therefore,
the status of an account is often designated as a numerical value.
The change in account assets is reflected by the change of the ac-
count status, which is represented by a real value.
Henceforth, we can give the following formal definitions of the
concepts used throughout this paper.
Definition 2.1 (State). As stated above, The state of a user is gen-
erally represented by a rational number s ∈ R. The state at time n
(i.e., the block height) is represented as sn .
Definition 2.2 (Account). An account is defined as the collection
of states. Given a state space S , an account space A, an account
A(k) ∈ A that has k states can be formally defined as:
A(k) = s1, . . . , si , si ∈ S, i = [1,k]
The state of A(k) at time n can be represented as:
Sn
k
= sn
1
, . . . , sni , si ∈ S, i = [1,k]
Definition 2.3 (Transaction). A transactionT i represents a change
of states.
Definition 2.4 (State Machine). A state machine represents the
change of account states over time. Given state transition function
F (I ,S) : S × S → S , where I , S ∈ S are the input and initial state
of F (S, I ) respectively, the state machine can be formally defined
as a collection of state transition functions, M = {F (Si ,Ri ) →
Si+1}. Among them, Si = Six is the states of all account at the
i-th transaction, Ri = Rix is the input of the account at the i-th
transaction.
As stated in the above definitions, a state machine represents
the relations among all transactions. In a blockchain system, trans-
actions are grouped into blocks according to certain rules, and the
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blocks form a directed chain structure, which generate the basic
data structure of the blockchain. In retrospect, the transaction at
time i + 1 can be formally defined as:
T i = F (Si ,Ri ) → Si+1.
Definition 2.5 (Ledge). A ledger is a collection of transactions.
The ledger at time n is represented as L(n) = T i , i = [1,n]. Specifi-
cally, a ledger is an ordered set of transactions.
Definition 2.6 (Revocable State). Definition 6 (Revocable State).
From business aspect, revocable statemeans that the change on the
account states should be partially or completely withdrawn under
strict regulatory conditions. For a given transaction sequence i and
j, where i < j, partially revocable means that changes on some
states of account A(x) can be withdrawn. i.e., s j = si ,si ∈ Six ,s
j ∈
S
j
x . The complete revocable means that all states of account A(x)
can be withdrawn. i.e., Sj = Si .
Definition 2.7 (Revocable Ledger). A revocable ledger is a dis-
tributed ledger system which uses a blockchain that supports a
complete revocable state.
2.2 Design of Account Model
In this section, we introduce the basic design of the account model
proposed by RTM. First, we give the formal definition of an account
used in a ledger system.
Definition 2.8 (Account). The account A(k) of user k can be for-
mally defined as:
A(k) = {k,addr (A), type,S(k),key(k),L(t), I (k),data}
Where:
• k is the unique identifier of account A(k);
• addr (k) is the address of A(k), i.e., an encoding of A(k)’s
public key;
• type represent the type of A(k), ∈ n,v , where "n" state for
standard account, and "v" state for vault account;
• S(k) is the state managed by account A(k), where Si
k
repre-
sent the state of account A(k) at time I ;
• key(k) is the private/public key pair of account A(k).
In order to support revocable status, RTM introduces two types
of accounts, namely the standard account and the vault account.
The standard account refers to the account used in traditionalUtxo-
based blockchain systems. The standard account is used for con-
ventional account transfer transactions. In this setting, the trans-
action changes the account status immediately, and it does not sup-
port revocable states.
The vault account is specifically designed for RTM. It supports
revocable states. From the user’s point of view, after an account
transfer transaction is initiated by a vault account, the change of
the account states can only come into effect after a delay period θ .
Within the delay period θ , the user can initiate a revocable transac-
tion to withdraw the change of the vault account states. For vault
account A(k),if type=v,then the follow holds:
• L(t) is the clear time (block height) of account A(k).
• I (k) defines the account where the revoked state is assigned
to. Namely, I (k) is called as the "retrieval account" of vault
account A(k), and generally located on a reputable third-
party exchange platform;
• Data is a list of transactions which records all the revocable
transactions initiated by vault account A(k).
Generally, the vault account is designed with the following char-
acteristics:
• Timedelay: The revocable transactionT i = F ({Si
k
, Sij },R
i
k
)
→ {Si+1
k
, Si+1j } can only be initiated by a vault account
A(k). For each revocable transaction, a delay period θ is as-
signed. From the application point of view, the account sta-
tus change can be rolled back during the period of θ .
• Revocable: Within the designated delay period θ , if A(k)
initiates a revocable transaction T j to revoke the operation
of T i , the revocable state can be rolled back to the original
state.
2.3 Design of Revocable Logic
Revocation logic represents the core of the revocable transaction
model (RTM). Therefore, the additional designed transactions in
RTM are detailed as follows:
Definition 2.9 (TVAR , VaultAccountRevocable Transaction). Trans-
actionTVAR define a revocable transaction. It is initiated by a vault
accountA(k), implementing a tentative account transfer operation
from A(k) to A(j). Formally:
T i
VAR
(k, j,θ) = F ({Si
k
, Sij },R
i
k
) → {Si+1
k
, Si+1j }, i ∈ N
Where θ is the designated delay time of T i
VAR
,and Si+1
k
= Si
k
−
Ri
k
, Si+1j = S
i
j + R
i
k
.
Definition 2.10 (TR , Revoke Transaction). TransactionTR is initi-
ated by a vault account A(k) to revoke the tentative account trans-
fer operation TSAR
i (k, j,θ) from the original vault account A(k).
The revocable states of A(k) is transferred to its bounded safety
account I (k). Formally:
Tm
R
(k,T i
V AR
) = F ({Si+1
k
, Si+1j }, I (k)) → {S
i
k
, Sij }, i,m ∈ N
The condition for TR to be correctly executed, attribute to that
the block height of transaction Tm is less than θ .
Definition 2.11 (TVAC , VaultAccountCreation Transaction). Trans-
action TVAC is used to create a vault account A(k). TVAC is initi-
ated by a normal accountA(j) by issuing an account transfer trans-
action, formally:
T i
VAC
= F ({Si
k
, Sij , I (k)},R
i
k
) → {Si+1
k
, Si+1j }, i ∈ N
Note that TVAC is not a revocable transaction. Once TVAC is
successfully executed, the state assigned by Ri
k
is transferred from
A(k) to the newly created vault account A(j), and the state of A(j)
is changed to Si+1j , as well as the state of A(k) is changed to S
i+1
k
,
where Si+1j − S
i+1
k
= Ri
k
. In the delay period θ , A(k) can initialize
a revocable transaction TR , withdraw the assets to the retrieval
account I (k) bounded by vault accountA(k).
Based on the designed transactionTVAR andTR , the revocation
logic of RTM is defined as follows:
(1) At time i , user k initiates a revocable transaction TVAR on
vault account A(k). TVAR specifies the tentative amount of
transfer assets I , the destination account A(j) of user j, and
the delay period θ for the transfer to take effect.
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(2) After the transaction is verified and confirmed on the blockchain,
TVAR , as a transaction, is recorded on the chain, and the sta-
tus changes involved inTVAR are also recorded in accounts
A(k) and A(j), but the state Si
k
and Sij are not immediately
changed.
(3) If at time i < n < θ , user k finds problems in the transaction,
the user can initiate a revoke transactionTR , and revoke the
transfer amount inTVAR to a retrieval account I (k) bounded
by A(k).
(4) If at time i < n < θ , a revoke transaction TR targeting a
TVAR is initiated, and TR is verified and confirmed on the
blockchain, then allTVAR transactions initiated after time n
are invalid transactions.
(5) At time n = θ , and TVAR is not revoked, the account states
of both users remains unchanged. i.e., the transfer operation
at time i is delayed. That is, Sn+1
k
= Sn
k
−Ri
k
, Sn+1j = S
n
j +R
i
k
.
(6) At time n ≥ θ , any revoke transactionTR initiated forTVAR
will be an invalid transaction.
2.4 Design of RTM’s Security Model
As stated by the early work of Rosenfeld[12], the cost of an attack
grows exponentially, which is also correct as long as the blockchain
system adopted consensus inmining blocks. In this work, we adopted
the formal model proposed by Garay et. al. [6] for the core of
the Bitcoin protocol, where blocks can be found simultaneously
as each mining steps. Therefore, we assume the following assump-
tions holds for the security model of the generalized RTM.
Assumption 1. The mining rate λ of the blockchain remains con-
stant over time. e.g. in Bitcoin, λ = 1
600
blocks per second.
Assumption 2. Under reliable networks, the block creation rates
aremuch higher than the propagation time of blocks. Surely, the block
propagate in the network is very fast relative to 1
λ
.
Assumption 3. The honest miners only keep track of the longest
chain they have been presented. i.e., the longest chain prevails.
Under these assumptions, the correct chain at time (height) h is
uniquely determined as L(n) = {Bh}, h = [1, t], where Bh denotes
a block at time h. Clearly, Bh holds a collection of accepted trans-
actions. Therefore, we formally define the acceptance probability
of a transaction.
Definition 2.12 (Acceptance Probability). The acceptance proba-
bility of a transaction that is robust against an arbitrary malicious
attack. Formally, based on the above assumption, given block Bh
at height h. For a correct transaction Thi to be record in block B
h ,
the acceptance probability can be roughly estimated as
Praccepted (T
h
i ) = {∃i : heiдht(T
h
i ) ≥ h +
i
λ
}
Similarly, for a malicious transaction to be recorded in block
block Bh , the acceptance probability can be roughly estimated as
Prmalicious(T
h
i ) = {i : h < heiдht(T
h
i ) < ∞}
Definition 2.13 (ε-robust Transaction). A transaction is ε-robust
transaction, or robust against malicious attack of blockchain, iff for
any transactions Thi at height h, the following holds:
Prmalicious(T
h
i )
Praccepted (T
h
i )
< ε
Definition 2.14 (ε-robust Model). A transaction model is ε-robust
Model, iff for any transactionsThi initiated by attackers, the follow-
ing holds:
∑
i∈T Pr(εmail iciousT
h
i ))
h
< ε
Without loss of generality, we adopt [13] to define the attacker’s
policy as a function that determines the action of the attacker at
every possible state. An attacker is assumed to initiate transaction
with probability Prmalicious(T
h
i ). Given that each transaction is in-
dependent from other transactions, we can assume that the accep-
tance probability follows identical and independent distribution
(i.i.d.). Thus, we simplify the probability of malicious attack risk
as Prmalicious . Intuitively, Prmalicious states the probability of a
standard account being hacked.
Consider the design of RTM. With the introduction of vault ac-
count detailed in Section 2.2, each user can have vault account in
addition to the traditional standard blockchain account. By design,
vault account support cascade to form a chain of revocable account
states. Figure 1 illustrates the general design of cascaded vault ac-
count and associated RTM transactions.
TVACTVAR TRRTM 
TVAR
A(k) A(k+1) A(k+2) A(k+n)
ȾȾȾSki Sk+1i+1 Sk+2i+2 Sk+ni+n
TVAR TVAR TVAR
TR TR TR TR
Cascaded Vault Account
Revocable
 State
Revocable
 State
Figure 1: The design of cascade vault account in RTM secu-
rity model.
In this setting, we get the following theorem to describe the
characteristics of vault account and RTM.
Theorem 2.15. The vault account support ε-robust transaction.
With the strong assumption of i.i.d. among transactions, the ac-
ceptance probability of malicious attack for a vault account with
n-level cascade can be minimized to
Prmalicious(T
h
i ) =
∏
n Prmalicious = Pr
n
malicious
Therefore, for ε-robust transactions, the probability of a vault
account being malicious hacked is less than εn . Given a concrete
example, if ε = 0.1, and vault account support 5 level cascade, then
Prmalicious(T
h
i ) < 0.1
5
= 1 × 10−5.
Theorem 2.16. RTM is ε-robust Model.
Proof. Intuitively,
∑
h [Prmalicious]
n
h
< ε
Wedefine that Prmalicious =
∑∞
h=0
1−Praccepted
Praccepted
·[
Praccepted
1−Praccepted
]
n
stochastically dominates the distribution of a random attack. The
event in which the attack will accepted is then equivalent to the
event that a randomwalk will ever arrive at a given cascaded vault
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account. Therefore, a necessary condition for a successful attack
is that, an attacker had managed to create a chain with height hˆ,
which is longer than the published chain, hˆ > h. Remind that in
most cases, Prmalicious < 0.5. This means that the acceptance
probability limn→∞ Prnmalicious → 0.

To summarize, the cascaded vault account design makes RTM a
ε-robustModel. Theoretically, vault account can efficiently prevent
malicious attack from being accepted by the blockchain.
3 FURTHER SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN
RTM
The design of RTM is based on existing mature blockchain tech-
nologies. Noteworthy, the improved account model improves the
security requirements in the actual applications, such as user key
theft and transfer operation error. Additionally, RTM has intro-
duced a radical new transaction type to tackle revocable state changes.
3.1 The impact on transaction performance
To tackle the problem of user error, financial fraud and account
transfer error, RTM has introduced new transaction types TVAR
and TR . Note that the implementation of TVAR and TR do not add
additional complexity to the existing transaction model, and there-
fore do not degrade the overall performance of the system.
Generally, existing blockchain transaction models can be classi-
fied into two categories: Bitcoin’sUtxo-basedmodel and Ethereum’s
account model. For the Utxo-based model, RTM only needs to add
an extra operation to check the type of the previous transaction, to
ensure whether it is a revocable transaction. Remind that in order
to verify the legality of the transaction, an extra operation to deter-
mine the transaction time (block height) should be added to RTM.
To be specific, to query the balance of an account, it is necessary to
distinguish between the revocable states and normal states in the
unspent transactions.
For Ethereum’s account model, an account balance check oper-
ation should be added to the implementation of TVAR . To query
the balance of an account, an extra account transfer operation is
needed.
Overall, the extra operations needed to implement TVAR and
TR have lower complexity , thus cannot significantly increase the
cost of transaction implementation. Therefore, adding revocable
transactions to the existing blockchain transaction model does not
degrade the overall performance. In fact, it can only be seen as
an advantage as it can prevent malicious users from attacking the
system by initiating a huge number of revocable transactions.
3.2 The impact on user operations
In order to tackle the problem of user key theft caused by hacking,
RTMhas improved the accountmodel by introducing a radical new
design named "Vault Account". Henceforth, a user can have two
types of accounts, i.e., a standard account and a vault account. Al-
though the vault account improves the security of the account op-
eration, it increases the complexity of the user operation. In order
to avoid the security risk caused by user errors in real world im-
plementation, the revocable account introduces extra operations
for compliance verification in accordance with the business logic.
Specifically, business logic compliance verification considers the
following aspects:
• A vault account can only initialize revocable transactions
TVAR andTR , andTVAR /TR must also be initialized from a
vault account.
• By adopting differentiating encoding for different types of
accounts, it is convenient for a user to intuitively distinguish
between a retrieval account and a standard account, thus
keeping users from mistakenly making a revocable transac-
tion instead of a standard transaction.
• A user can use the account balance to check revocable states
(assets) and normal states. This helps users to confirm trans-
action types, and avoid blurring revocable transactions with
standard transactions.
3.3 The double spend attact
The "double spend" attack means that an account can transfer the
same asset to more than one account. The essence of this attack is
to use some abnormal factors such as network delays to purposely
cause illegal inconsistencies between the nodes in a distributed
ledger system. Generally, a blockchain system can avoid the "dou-
ble spend" attack by leveraging atomic broadcasting and consensus
mechanisms.
In RTM, the verification of the revocable transaction is the same
as the verification of the standard transaction. To be specific, for a
Utxo-based transaction model, the verification of a current trans-
action needs to specify the previous transaction. For the Ethereum-
based account model, the verification needs to check the account
balance. Once a transaction is issued, the assets transferred out of
an account will be deducted..Therefore, revocation of the transac-
tion will not result in additional double spend risk. Specifically, the
mechanisms used by TVAR and TR can be detailed as :
• ForTVAR , the assets involved inTVAR cannot be transferred
out multiple times. Like traditional transfer business logic,
the change of account status for a revocable transaction should
be delayed. However, from the transaction point of view, as
long as the transaction status change can be verified by the
blockchain system, the correctness of the transaction can be
guaranteed by the blockchain itself.
• ForTR , the assets involved inTR cannot be withdrawn mul-
tiple times. Once aTR transaction is verified by a blockchain
system, the correctness of the transaction can also be guar-
anteed by the blockchain itself. Furthermore, in the imple-
mentation of the business logic, a compliance rule is further
defined, which defines that the receiving account cannot use
the assets in a delay period Îÿ. This compliance check fur-
ther ensures the robustness of the revocable logic.
4 GATECHAIN: A VERIFICATION
IMPLEMENTATION OF RTM
Using the proposed transactionmodel RTM, in this paperwe imple-
mented a verification blockchain system calledGateChain. Specif-
ically,GateChain adopted the RTMdesign, with its structure based
on the state-of-the-art platform Tendermint [12], leveraging the
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distributed network and consensus mechanism provided by Ten-
dermint Core, and the application layer implemented by using Cos-
mos SDK. Figure 2 illustrates the general structure of GateChain.
P2P Network Layer
Consensus Layer
(dPoS + Tendermint BFT)
Cosmos SDK
Interface
ABCI
RTM
Tendermint Core
Account System
GateChain
Figure 2: The general structure of GateChain, a verification
implementation of RTM.
In essence, GateChain implemented several verification fea-
tures targeting RTM. First, GateChain introduced the vault ac-
count to hold revocable states. Each vault account should bind a
safety account as the revoked output of the vault account. Sec-
ond, GateChain introduced the revocable transaction logic pro-
posed by RTM. This application logic is well suited for the cir-
cumstance when a user is securely holding his private key but is-
sues an unintended transfer transaction, for example hacking, mis-
use or financial fraud. Third, to support the revocable transaction
logic, GateChain presented a solid implementation of TVAR ,TR
and TVAC , as proposed in Section 2.3.
4.1 Implementation of Account Model
In order to simultaneously support the revocable transactions and
the standard transactions,GateChain has implemented two types
of accounts: the standard account and the vault account.
The standard account has no difference with the account imple-
mented in Utxo-based blockchain systems, and it is applicable to
the standard account transfer scenarios. By default, the transferred
assets arrive immediately, showing no revocable behavior. This is
well suited for general transfer applications.
The vault account supports revocable transactions. The assets
transferred from this type of account can only arrive after the des-
ignated delay period θ , while the transaction itself is adequately
recorded by the blockchain system. In a single run, the status of
a vault account will remain unchanged until the delay period ex-
pires. Noting that during the delay period, the vault account can
initiate another transaction to revoke the aforementioned transac-
tion, and withdraw the corresponding assets back to a designated
retrieval account.
As stated in section 2.2, the target account which accepts the
withdrawn assets from the vault account is called a retrieval ac-
count, which can be a standard account or a vault account. It is
worth noting that the withdrawn assets of the vault account are
not directly returned to the originating vault account itself, but to
a retrieval account its bounded to.
The introduce of retrieval account increases the security of revo-
cable transactions. From an application point of view, distinguish-
ing the account type makes clear to the user:
• Whether the current account is a vault account or a standard
account
• Whether the assets transferred by the account are revocable
• Whether the revocable transaction has taken effect.
Therefore, this implementation lets the user select different ac-
count types according to their actual needs.
Note that a risk must be considered in real application scenario,
which can be called the revoke of a delay transfer. To be specific, a
malicious payer can initiate a revoke transaction which tentatively
transfer certain amount to a payee. If payee mistakenly consider
this as a normal transfer, and concluded the transaction in turn.
The malicious payer can revoke the tentative transfer, thus causes
an intended business fraud. To tackle this risk, GateChain intro-
duces two encoding mechanism to technically explicify the type of
transaction. Firstly, each account is encoded with a prefix to distin-
guish between standard account and vault account. From the prefix
adhere to an account address, use can explicitly judge the type of
the initiated transaction. Secondly, each transaction id is also en-
coded with a predefined prefix to stamp different transaction type,
which details in Section 4.2. Encoding mechanism technically pre-
vent the user from mistaken a revoke transaction with a standard
transaction, thus take adequate action henceforth.
4.2 Implementation of Transaction Model
In addition to the standard transaction types supported by a vanilla
Utxo-based blockchain , GateChain introduces two types of re-
vocable transactions named TVAR and TR . Both types of transac-
tions can only be initiated by a vault account, supporting revocable
states. The consensus of GateChain is supported by the underly-
ing consensus mechanism provided by the Tendermint platform.
The implementation of these two transactions does not add any
additional cost to the system as a whole. To be specific, different
types of transactions are distinguished by a set prefix encoding.
That is, a transaction is named following the pattern of "fixed trans-
action type + transaction hash value".The transaction prefix helps
the user to clearly distinguish the transaction type, avoiding *unin-
tended* operations and invalid operations. On the other hand, this
design can help the blockchain itself and the application to check
the correctness of a transaction, thus improving the security of the
system. Details of transaction prefixes are listed as Table 1.
The revocable logic of the transaction is applicable to the sce-
nario in which the user properly owns his private key, and wants
to revoke the transfer operations initiated by a vault account. The
logic is implemented as vault account A initiates a transaction to
transfer some assets to a designated account B, and sets the trans-
action type asTVAR , i.e., a revocable transaction. After the transac-
tion is successfully executed, the transaction and the delay period
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Table 1: List of predefined transaction prefixes
Transaction type Transaction prefix
Irrevocable pay INREVOCABLEPAY-<id>
Revocable pay REVOCABLEPAY-<id>
Setting an account ACCOUNTSET-<id>
Revoke a revocable pay REVOKE-<id>
Clear a Vault Account VAULTCLEAR-<id>
Regular transaction BASIC-<id>
are recorded in account A and B separately. However, the trans-
ferred assets are not immediately available in bothA and B. In the
event that the transaction delay period has expired, the transfer
transaction is officially effective and the assets are officially avail-
able in B. Therefore, during the delay period of the transaction, the
vault accountA itself may initiate a revoke transactionTR , the asset
is withdrawn to a safety account bounded by A. Note that the op-
eration of TR takes effect immediately, and the transfer operation
is cancelled for account B. Generally, the safety accounts are typ-
ically located on a third-party trustworthy platform. The transac-
tion itself is recorded in the blocks of GateChain, and the inactive
transactions maintained in the account are cleared by GateChain.
To conclude, GateChain implements a lightweight RTM based
on existing mature blockchain technologies, namely, the Tender-
mint platform and the Cosmos SDK.
5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Real world business, such as financial transfers, government reg-
ulation, copyright transactions, personal privacy, and transaction
rollback logic, all natively require that the blockchain system should
support revocable transactions. Regarding the perspective of im-
plementation, revocable and non-tamperable are not two contra-
dictory concepts. The reason lies in that as long as a revocable
transaction is verified on the blockchain, the transaction itself is
supported by the mechanism provided by a blockchain. Thus, we
can add revocable features into existing blockchain systems by im-
proving the design of the transaction model. This has proven to
be the best way in natively implementing a revocable-supported
blockchain.
We believe that, as an innovative technology, the blockchain
ecosystem itself is continuously evolving. Some new features will
be reflected in the design and implementation of the blockchain
in the near future, and in the form of "native" blockchain charac-
teristics. Undoubtedly, revocable transactions are such a feature.
Although blockchain technology is still in its exploratory phase in
many areas, it is certain that it will continue to evolve and improve,
leading to wide adoption in many fields.
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